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The board of directors is an integral part of corporate governance which plays an 
important role in corporate performance. And board size is one of the factors 
determining its operation efficiency. Prior literature documents that larger boards 
pursue conservative policies and the decisions they made are moderate, which lead to 
an environment of risk aversion and reduce firm risk. As board of directors functions 
on behalf of stock holders, it’s meaningful to find out whether larger board would hurt 
stock holders’ interests. The innovation of this study is to make research from the 
perspective of firm risk.  
This study argues that when firms hold great amounts of long-term debt, the risk 
reduction caused by larger boards would hurt equity holders but benefit creditors. 
Addressing potential endogeneity problems associated with board size, this study 
findsthat in firms which have a large amount of long-term debt, there is an equity 
discount associated with larger boards. But in firms without long-term debt, the 
negative correlation between equity value and board size disappears. Further research 
also indicates that firms with largerboards enjoy a lower realized cost of debt. Overall, 
this study suggests that the association between board size and equity value is a 
function of the firm’s debt structure. 
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规模大的董事会能更好地发挥建议与宣传的作用（Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2008[3]; 
Dalton et al., 1999[4]），更适合业务复杂、多元化经营的公司。 
尽管对公司而言没有最优的董事会规模，但是董事会规模会影响公司策略选




































































事会规模应不小于 5，不大于 19。样本中中国公司董事会规模的标准差为 1.753，








从群体的标准（Brown, 1965[15]; Stoner, 1968[16]）。群体决策的偏向与群体规模大
小及群体成员的构成是一种类型还是不同类型有关（Teger, Pruitt, 1967[17]; Watson, 
Kumar, 1992[18]）。根据 Hofstede's（1985）[19], Hofstede 和 Minkov（2010）[20]
关于文化价值观的研究，中国文化对集体主义比日本更看重，对风险的容忍度更
低，这和美国看重个人主义有很大差别。研究发现注重集体主义而轻视个人主义
的群体往往愿意承担的风险更低（Li, Griffin, Yue, Zhao, 2013[21]; Mihet, 2013[22]）。 
综上所述，本文在已有研究基础上，考虑中国企业制度、文化及所处环境的
















































本文所涉及的所有数据初步整理均采用 EXCEL 2010 软件，所有实证分析均
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